

component of this is a free press. This, too, may not seem like a breath-taking observation, but it is often underappreciated in the literature and Brock notes that ‘In 2003, it was found that 17 per cent of the world’s population live in countries with a free press, 40 per cent have a partly free press, and 43 per cent have a press that is not free. These figures do show a “considerable decline” over recent years. Notable declines were observed in the Americas, in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union’ (pp. 162–3). Thus, rather than bemoan the general lack of democratic accountability, Brock helpfully encourages us to focus more specifically on bolstering free press in crucial ‘hot spots’.

To sum up, anyone working on global justice should read this excellent book. It is theoretically sophisticated, empirically informed, and refreshingly optimistic. Brock is optimistic in part because she argues that global justice does not require us to move as far from the status quo as many other theorists insist, but also because she has a number of creative suggestions for relatively modest institutional reform which, if implemented, seem sure to make the world a much more just place.

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Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice, by Thomas L. Carson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xix + 280. H/b £35.00.

According to Epictetus, ‘liars are the cause of *all* the sins and crimes in the world’. While this may overstate the case to some degree, lying and deception are certainly critical issues in moral philosophy and in everyday life. Thomas Carson has given us the first book-length philosophical work in decades to systematically confront these issues.

The book is divided into three sections. In the ‘Conceptual Analysis’ section (Pt. 1), Carson defends his definitions of lying and deceiving. Roughly speaking, you *lie* if you say something that you do not believe and you *warrant the truth* of what you say. And, basically, you warrant the truth of what you say if you *promise* or you offer a *guarantee* that what you say is true. You *deceive* someone if you intentionally cause her to believe something (or to persist in believing something) that you know to be false.

Carson also analyses several related concepts, such as *keeping someone in the dark*, *spin*, and *half-truths*. As he discusses later in the book, even if they fall short of lying and deceiving, these phenomena can also be morally

problematic. In addition, while he does not provide his own analysis of the concept, Carson gives compelling arguments against several claims famously made by Harry Frankfurt about *bullshit*. He shows that bullshit need not be intended to deceive, that bullshit and lies are not mutually exclusive categories, and that bullshitters can be concerned with the truth of what they say.

In the 'Moral Theory' section (Pt. 2), Carson surveys and criticizes what several prominent moral theories have to say about the morality of lying and deception, and then proposes his own theory.

Moral theories tend to agree that it is usually wrong to lie or to deceive. But there is stark disagreement about many cases. For instance, Kant's view is extremely restrictive. It is never OK to lie, even to save a life or to prevent a catastrophe. By contrast, act-utilitarianism (AU) is fairly permissive. It is OK to lie even if it only brings about a very slight increase in overall utility. However, Carson argues that Kant's theory is really less restrictive than we might have thought. No version of the Categorical Imperative supports an absolute ban on lying. Also, Carson argues that AU is really not as permissive as it might seem. There are many bad consequences of lying (both direct and indirect) that liars have a tendency to ignore.

W. D. Ross's duty-based theory and Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism chart a more attractive middle course. However, Carson argues that these theories are too reliant on questionable moral intuitions. In order to avoid relying on such disputed intuitions, Carson argues for a version of the Golden Rule that any rational, consistent, and fully informed individual would have to accept. Applying this principle to lying and deception, we cannot consistently say that it is OK for us to lie under certain circumstances, but object when someone else lies to us under the same sort of circumstances. Since we would object to being told a lie that causes us great harm in order to bring a slight benefit to the liar, it is not permissible for us to tell such a lie ourselves. Basically, Carson's version of the Golden Rule supports a ban on lying at least as strong as AU. While this account answers many important questions about the morality of lying, it also leaves many questions open because reasonable people might disagree.

In the 'Applications' section (Pt. 3), Carson addresses lying and deception in sales, in advertising, and in business negotiations. He argues for moral principles tailored to these contexts that are in line with his version of the Golden Rule. Carson also discusses lying and deception by professionals and by political leaders. And in these contexts, the concern is not just with potentially harmful lying and deception. Carson argues that such people also have an obligation not to withhold information that is likely to benefit clients and citizens.

In this section, Carson also discusses the dire consequences of falsifying the historical record, such as when the myth of the 'stab in the back' contributed to World War Two and the Holocaust. But in addition to actual falsification, there is a problem with simply ignoring those parts of the historical record

that support views that we disagree with. In this context, Carson briefly discusses the importance of *intellectual honesty*. Instead of considering the arguments and evidence on all sides of an issue with an open mind, we often 'discount or deny evidence that tends to undermine [our] cherished beliefs' (p. 252). While this book is concerned almost exclusively with the morality of lying to others and deceiving others, this is one place where it touches briefly on the issue of self-deception.

The concept of *warranting the truth of what you say*, which runs throughout the book, is probably the most important and innovative aspect of the book. Carson argues that this concept is critical to what lying is and to why lying is wrong.

According to a fairly traditional philosophical definition, lying requires an intention to deceive. However, in a series of articles going back to 1982, Carson has argued that not all lies are intended to deceive. For instance, suppose that a student is called into the dean's office and is accused of cheating. But based on the dean's reputation, the guilty student knows that he will not be punished as long as he asserts his innocence. Even though he does not expect or intend to deceive the dean, the student still seems to be lying. As Carson puts it, the student 'goes on the record' with something that he believes to be false (p. 21).

In order to accommodate what Roy Sorensen (*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 2007) has subsequently dubbed 'Bald-Faced Lies!', Carson claims that lying requires warranting the truth of something that you do not believe rather than an intention to deceive. But since warranting that something is true is essentially the same as promising that it is true, we arguably have an obligation not to tell lies for the same reason that we have an obligation not to break promises. As Carson puts it, 'my warranting the truth of something I say to you justifies you in complaining to me if it is not true' (p. 27).

There is a longstanding debate in moral philosophy over whether lying is, *ceteris paribus*, morally worse than attempting to deceive in other ways. And although Carson does not address this question directly, his concept of warranting provides a potential explanation for why lying is worse. When liars try to get us to believe something false, they do so by explicitly *assuring* us that that thing is true.

Moreover, as Carson emphasizes several times in the 'Applications' section, the problem with lying is not merely with warranting the truth of something that you do not believe. Warranting is something that comes in degrees. And the higher the degree to which you warrant it, the worse it is to warrant the truth of something that you do not believe. For instance, given their specialized knowledge and their public codes of conduct, the recommendations of professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, are warranted to a very high degree. So, it is especially objectionable when they betray the trust of their clients by lying to them.

As Carson points out, it is also possible to warrant the truth of something to a greater degree than you know that it deserves without actually lying about it. For instance, even if Dick Cheney believed that Saddam Hussein was building nuclear weapons in 2002, he overly warranted this claim by lying about having ‘irrefutable evidence’ for it (p. 216). In fact, you can do this without lying at all. For instance, ‘on a solemn occasion, such as the State of the Union Address, a democratically elected leader warrants the truth of what he says to a very high degree ... [but] ... Bush knew that there was a basis for doubting these claims’ (p. 217). Of course, this raises the question of whether it is the deceptive warranting that is really morally problematic rather than the issue of lying per se.

In the ‘Conceptual Analysis’ section, Carson is at pains to emphasize that lying does not require an intention to deceive. But in the remainder of the book, he focuses on the morality of lies that are intended to deceive. He does not directly address the question of whether lying is wrong if it is not deceptive at all.

Sorensen agrees with Carson that lying does not require an intention to deceive. But he argues that lies that are not intended to deceive are ‘morally neutral’. He claims that ‘the wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive—just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies’. While Carson does not respond directly to Sorensen’s arguments, he does say that a lie is essentially an insincere promise, regardless of whether it is intended to deceive. As noted above, this might suggest that it is wrong to lie for basically the same reason that it is wrong to make promises that you do not intend to keep. But it is not clear that the analogy with promising really gives us a unified account of the wrongness of lying.

There are two main types of explanations for why it is wrong to break promises (see e.g. Allen Habib, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2008). First, breaking a promise disappoints the legitimate expectation of the person who was given the promise that the promise would be kept. As a result, the promisee is likely to be harmed by virtue of having relied on the promiser to keep her promise. Second, breaking a promise tends to undermine the socially beneficial practice of making promises. However, neither of these explanations applies to *openly* insincere promises. Thus, they do not help to explain why it is wrong to tell bald-faced lies. First, people are unlikely to suffer the epistemic harm of acquiring a false belief as a result of relying on a bald-faced lie to be true. Second, it is not clear that bald-faced lies damage the socially beneficial practice of truth telling. As Sorensen puts it, ‘bald-faced lies do not fool anyone. They are no more a threat to truth telling than sarcastic remarks’. In the case of some openly insincere promises, we may have an obligation to do exactly what we promised to do. But as Tim Scanlon (*What We Owe To Each Other*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 314) points out, the obligation is ‘not necessarily of the kind generated

by a promise' (i.e. the source of the obligation does not appear be the same as it is for keeping promises in general).

In addition to appealing to the analogy with promising, Carson also cashes out what it means to warrant the truth of something in terms of *inviting someone to believe* something. Some critics, such as James Mahon (*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2011), have suggested that inviting someone to believe something without intending her to believe it just does not make sense. (Thus, inviting someone to believe something that you do not believe *would* require intending to deceive her.) However, it seems clear to me that you can extend an invitation to someone without expecting or intending her to accept the invitation. For instance, as Carson points out, 'I can invite my estranged uncle to attend my wedding while knowing and hoping that he won't come' (p. 26).

Even so, it would have been helpful if Carson had said more about what it means to invite someone to believe something. In particular, it would be useful to know exactly what obligations you undertake as a result of extending such an invitation. If you invite someone to believe something, it might be that you can fulfill your obligations simply by defending your claim in the face of legitimate challenges (or by retracting your claim at that time). Similarly, even if you do not want your uncle to attend your wedding, you can still fulfill your obligations by giving him a seat if he unexpectedly shows up. Alternatively, it might be that you have immediately failed in your obligations simply by virtue of warranting the truth of something that you do not believe.

Finally, while I think that Carson's analysis comes very close to capturing the normative element of lying, it is not clear to me that lying *requires* warranting the truth of what you say. Someone could certainly say, '*p*, but I can't *guarantee* that it's true.' (Similarly, as Sorensen points out, someone could say, '*p*, but I am not inviting you to agree with me'.) Such a speaker does not seem to be promising that what she says is true, or offering any sort of guarantee that it is true. But the speaker would still seem to be lying if she knows that *p* is false. She has 'gone on the record' with something that she does not believe. In fact, she might even intend to deceive her audience and, thus, be lying according to the traditional philosophical definition.

There are a few ways that Carson might try to deal with such 'proviso lies.' However, none of these strategies should ultimately be very attractive to Carson since defenders of the traditional philosophical definition of lying might try to deal with his counter-examples to their definition in essentially the same ways. First, Carson might suggest that proviso lies are at best 'borderline' cases of lying and should not be used to test definitions of lying (p. 38). But in a similar vein, defenders of the traditional philosophical definition might claim that bald-faced lies should not be used to test definitions of lying because they are not prototypical instances of lying either. Second, Carson might suggest that, despite the proviso, the original statement is still

‘warranted to a certain minimum degree’ (p. 33). But it might also be suggested, of any purported instance of bald-faced lying, that the speaker really does have at least some faint hope of deceiving his audience. Third, Carson might suggest that, if the proviso *does* completely eliminate the warrant, the original statement is no longer an assertion (and, thus, is no longer a lie). In fact, he writes that ‘in that case, the second part of the utterance seems to undermine the first part, and the utterance is no longer a straightforward statement or assertion’ (p. 38). But defenders of the traditional philosophical definition might similarly insist that bald-faced lies are not assertions (and, thus, are not lies) unless the speaker has at least some faint hope of convincing his audience.

Carson has produced an excellent work that combines conceptual analysis, moral theory, and applied philosophy. Anyone interested in lying and deception from any of these philosophical perspectives should read this book. Moreover, Carson is right to emphasize the conceptual and moral importance of warranting the truth of what you do not believe. But much more could still be said to elucidate this concept and its moral relevance.

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Beyond Moral Judgment, by Alice Crary. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. x + 240. H/b £32.95, P/b £16.95.

Alice Crary’s book is an intriguing and subtle attack on a view she regards as an orthodoxy in ethics, namely the idea that ‘moral thought invariably comes in the form of moral judgements, where these are understood as judgments that apply some moral concept or other’ (p. 1). She proposes, instead, that ‘the concerns of ethics ... reach beyond moral judgment to the whole sensibilities characteristic of individuals as language users’ (p. 4). In the first part of the book Crary argues that the orthodox or traditional conception can be traced to implausible accounts of objectivity and linguistics, develops her preferred conceptions of these and of ethics that they underwrite, and shows how elements of this picture gain support from the writings of J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein. The second part of the book contains illustrations of the forms of moral thought that go beyond moral judgement as traditionally conceived. Crary first focuses on examples of moral thinking inspired by literature, arguing that the novels of Jane Austen, E. M. Forster, and Leo