



Your Contributor Contract and Proof

Dear Contributor(s),

Thank you for publishing with us. Please find enclosed your contributor proof.

Please be sure to fill out the **current address details** on the relevant form and send us the corrections. We need this data so that you can download **your contribution as a PDF** from our homepage (see <https://www.degruyter.com/cms/pages/faq-for-authors-and-editors>) and so we can send you your **free copies** if you have made a corresponding agreement with us. Your data from this form will only be used for internal processes and will not be passed on.

In order for the contribution to appear, we also ask you to conclude the attached **contributor contract** by ticking the box and adding a date. Any special written agreements with us also apply.

Thank you for your cooperation!

De Gruyter

Appendices

- Title page of the Contributor Contract
- Address form
- General Terms and Conditions for Contributor Contract
- Proof

CONTRIBUTOR CONTRACT

Between

De Gruyter

and

Corresponding Contributor

Thomas L. Carson

Regarding

Chapter Title:

Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics

Chapter DOI:

10.1515/9783110733730-002

Book Title:

From Lying to Perjury

Creative-Commons- License:

a Contributor Contract has been concluded. Details regarding the Contributor Contract are specified in the attached General Terms and Conditions for Contributor Contract.

Address form

Book title: From Lying to Perjury

Chapter DOI: 10.1515/9783110733730-002

Chapter title: Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics

We ask for your current address details for the following purposes:

- Your postal address for sending free copies (if agreed)
- Your email address to activate your personal download of your contribution as a PDF from <https://www.degruyter.com>

Please note that free copies and your personal download can only be processed with complete data.

Contributor 1

Corresponding address according to available information		To be changed
Salutation* (Mr/Ms/other)		
Title		
Surname*	Carson	
First Name*	Thomas L.	
E-Mail*	tcarson@luc.edu	
Corresponding Author* (yes/no)	yes	
Institution	Loyola University of Chicago	
Department		
Number*		
Street*		
ZIP Code*		
City*		
State		
Country*		

*required

Please check the data in the second column carefully and note any changes in the third column.

Please do so, even if you have already transmitted this data to the publisher or the editor in some other way.

Your data from this form will only be used for internal processes and will not be passed on.

You may find more information about your personal download of your contribution from our homepage at <https://www.degruyter.com/cms/pages/faq-for-authors-and-editors>.

**Checked and confirmed:
(In case of multiple authors by the corresponding author.)**

Address information and Contributor Contract

Date _____

(By inserting the check mark you confirm the conclusion of the Contributor Contract for your contribution. In case of technical problems with the check mark, you can agree to the contract by typing “Confirmed” in the date field, e.g.: “Confirmed, 17.4.2020”.)

GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR CONTRIBUTOR CONTRACT

These General Terms and Conditions are an integral part of your Contributor Contract. The individual details of your agreement with us can be found on the sheet titled *Contributor Contract*.

Our goal as a publisher is to be a competent partner to our contributors and to facilitate the quality, reach, reputation, and validity of their work. In order to do so, both parties must commit to a set of rules as follows:

1 Definitions

You: You as the Contributor of the Work. When there is more than one Contributor, the term "You" shall apply collectively and the provisions set out in these terms and conditions apply equally to all Contributors.

We: the Walter De Gruyter GmbH Publisher named in your *Contributor Contract*.

Work: the content to be published as printed and electronic edition.

Contributor Contract: the actual agreement, which is issued to you as a cover page to these terms and conditions.

2 Your Rights and Obligations

- 2.1 **Grant of Rights:** As a publisher, we take copyright very seriously. We must make sure that we have the right to use all parts of your Work. You warrant that you own the manuscript, and that you are free to assign the rights without restriction and have acquired the rights to any content as necessary. This applies to all parts, including any illustrations, indices, tables, textual excerpts, multimedia components, etc. Further, you warrant that you have not assigned any rights that would conflict with the rights granted to us in this contract. You guarantee that your work, including all parts, does not infringe on any rights such as copyrights, performing rights, trademarks, rights of privacy, or other third-party rights. You agree to reimburse us for any costs or liabilities resulting from a breach of these warranties.
- 2.2 **Publication Elsewhere:** In order to support the marketing strategy for your Work, you agree not to publish the Work (or a substantially equivalent work) or make it otherwise available to the public without first obtaining our written consent.
- 2.3 **Repository Policy:** You are free to self-archive up to 10% of the Work (with the exception of textbooks and databases) on your own website or in the repository of your university or institution. In addition, you may place a link to the product page of your Work on our website www.degruyter.com in public repositories that allow a redirect. You can find a complete list in the Rights and Licenses section of our website.
- 2.4 **VG Wort:** You grant to us, for the duration of the contract, all usage rights that may be exercised at collecting societies such as VG Wort and VG Bild-Kunst according to their contractual stipulations. The granting of these rights serves the purpose of registration at the collection societies for mutual exercising of rights. The proceeds from the exercising of rights are distributed by the collecting societies according to §27 Abs. 2 VGG and according to the shares defined in their distribution plan, and are distributed directly to copyright holders and publishers. You agree that you must conclude an agreement directly with the collecting society in order to receive the (copyright-holder) share of the distribution.

3 Grant of Rights

- 3.1 **Rights of Use:** You assign to us, for the purpose of ensuring the optimal distribution and availability of your work the right:
 - a) To reproduce, distribute, and make available your Work in printed form including as print-on-demand;
 - b) To produce machine-readable forms of your Work (including digitization) and to store it electronically in all storage media, including in our own databases and those of third parties, such as Amazon or Google;
 - c) To make your Work available in part with "look inside" functionality, for example on Amazon or Google;
 - d) To reproduce and make available your Work in electronic form, particularly as eBook, database, and/or other forms of electronic media and within the scope of internet services or other online uses or in interactive multimedia production;
 - e) To make your Work available in public or closed user groups at the location and time of their choice (for example, eBook use in libraries) as well as reproducing it on monitors or other scanners and to be printed by the user as many times as the user wishes, in whole or in part, including as prepublication or in excerpt;
 - f) To reproduce and distribute your Work on any and all data carriers, for example DVD, CD-Rom, flash drive.
- 3.2 **Ancillary Rights:** You also assign to us, for the purpose of optimally exercising the rights to your Work, the right:
 - a) To translate it into other languages and to use the translation;
 - b) To print it in whole or in part as a prepublication and/or as subsequent reprint, including in newspapers and periodicals (for example in reviews);
 - c) To publish it in whole or in part in our other publications or publications of another publisher, including in abridged form;
 - d) To produce or license as a paperback, or as a popular or special or reprint edition;
 - e) To reproduce and distribute it in a collected works edition and in compilations, even after 20 years have elapsed since the first publication of the Work;
 - f) To reproduce and distribute it by all other means, including photocopying, photomechanical reprinting, or as Braille embossing;
 - g) Of rendition, including rights to recitation, performances, and broadcast in radio or television media or internet;

- h) To transfer it, in full or in part, to sound recordings, image or image-sound recordings as well as the right to their reproduction, distribution, and reproduction to the public;
- i) To use it in collections for use in church, school, or instructional settings.
- 3.3 **Extension of Rights:** Unless otherwise specified in the provisions for contributors in the authors section of our website you grant all usage rights and ancillary rights to us as exclusive rights without any restriction as to content or territory for the duration of the copyright. We may exercise these rights but are under no obligation to do so to the extent described here.
- 3.4 **Unknown Types of Use:** You grant us the exclusive and permanent rights without any restriction as to content and territory for all forms of media of expression now known or that will be developed in the future. The granting of rights extends to the exercising of rights through us or through the granting of these rights to a third party.
- 3.5 **Transfer to Third Parties:** You grant us the right to transfer all rights listed here to third parties and/or to license the Work to third parties. We require these rights in order to fulfil certain sales models such as online use through aggregators (platforms that curate content for specific usage by customers and give us a share of the proceeds). We naturally require that all licensees provide appropriate attribution to you, the copyright holder.

4 Open Access

In the case that we have mutually agreed to publish your Work as Open Access, the following conditions apply in addition:

- 4.1 You are free to publish your Work according to a Creative Commons license (<https://creativecommons.org>), as of a date agreed upon with us. You choose the appropriate license when discussing the contractual details with us (see *Contributor Contract*). You have the choice between:
 - a) CC-BY (Attribution)
 - b) CC-BY-NC-ND (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives).
- 4.2 We will provide you with the final version of your Work as a PDF file. This is the version that is published Open Access.
- 4.3 We will publish your Work as a freely available eBook on our website under the license you have chosen and which is shown in the *Contributor Contract*.
- 4.4 According to the license stated in 6.1, you are of course free to put the eBook version of your Work on your own home-page, a university or institutional repository, or any website of your choice.

5 Manuscript / Content

- 5.1 **General:**
 - a) We and the editors are authorized to change your Work after prior discussion with you, or to ask you to make changes in order to maintain the consistency of the series, the volume, or the database.
 - b) In addition, to ensure quality of your Work before final acceptance, we are authorized to ask a third party to review the Work. Should revisions be necessary, you will be asked to perform these. Should you be unable or unwilling to do so, we reserve the right to deny acceptance or publication of your Work.
 - c) Our customers and readers are interested in the most precise information possible regarding your Work. Please inform us immediately as soon as you become aware that you will not be able to deliver by the date agreed upon in the *Contributor Contract* or that the manuscript deviates by more than 10% of the length agreed upon.
 - d) If your Work contains an index, you are required to create an index according to our technical specifications. If the publication date is delayed by more than 6 weeks as a result of index preparation, we reserve the right to publish the Work without an index. In the electronic version of the Work, the full-text search replaces the need for a separate index.
 - e) If you cannot adhere to the manuscript length or the submission deadlines agreed upon with you in your *Contributor Contract* (e. g. delayed delivery of the Work), we reserve the right to set a new deadline or to plan a different form of publication. If the second deadline also cannot be kept, we reserve the right to deny publication or to reduce your royalty.
- 5.2 **Manuscript for Typesetting**
 - a) This option is for manuscripts that will be professionally typeset. You submit the manuscript to be typeset as an electronic file, usually in the format docx, tex, rtf, or indd. Formulas and tables should not be anchored in the manuscript as images. In addition, we require a PDF file or a definitive printout for comparison including reproducible copies of illustrations / high-resolution image files.
 - b) After the manuscript has been prepared by our typesetter, we provide you with proofs for corrections. In most cases, you will receive proofs in electronic format as a PDF file or via a web-based online proofing system. We ask for your understanding that we generally provide one set of proofs for correction and a second set of proofs for your approval for printing (imprimatur).
 - c) The first set of proofs is provided for you to check the manuscript conversion to typesetting. Please check these proofs carefully for any mistakes (e. g., word breaks) that may have occurred during the process. Kindly note that only minor content corrections can be done at this late stage. If the index entries were not already anchored in the manuscript, we will ask you to do this during the first correction stage.
 - d) The second set of proofs is simply to check that any corrections marked in the first proof run have been carried out, and for you to provide your approval for printing (imprimatur), if need be under the condition that final corrections be carried out before the work is printed. We will check these final corrections internally in order to ensure punctual publication of your Work. We retain the right to decide when the manuscript is ready to print from a technical and typographical point of view.

- e) We ask for your cooperation in keeping the number of corrections at a reasonable and necessary level. Changes to the Work after the submission of the final manuscript are very costly. We cover the cost of corrections up to two per printed page, and reserve the right to charge you if changes made beyond that result in excessive costs and/or if these changes require additional print runs. This does not apply if corrections are required due to errors in the typesetting process or due to new academic findings or legal decisions.

5.3 Writing and Submitting via a Content Management System (CMS)

- a) Particularly in the case of encyclopedias, dictionaries and reference works, which are often published "ahead of print," we may use a so-called Content Management System (CMS), which is individually configured for each Work.
- b) We provide the CMS to you, and we request that you use it to write and submit your Work. You will receive an invitation to the system and all relevant supporting guidelines and documentation.
- c) Reviews by the series or volume editors or in-house editors as well as manuscript revision and corrections are done directly in the CMS. Please follow the style and content guidelines to avoid unnecessary delays.
- d) At the relevant point in the process, you will be contacted to provide your approval for publication of the content (not the form). Please make only those corrections which are absolutely necessary at this time. Changes to content are no longer possible, as they can no longer be reviewed. If you do not respond to the call for approval by the given deadline, approval will be assumed.
- e) We support your work in the CMS with detailed instructions and guidelines, and are personally available if there are problems. Any decisions regarding bug fixes or other technical issues will be made solely by us.

6 Publication Subsidy / Open Access Fee

- 6.1 A publication subsidy may be required for some works to be paid plus VAT if not mutually agreed in the Contributor Contract.
- 6.2 If we have come to a mutual agreement to publish your Work as Open Access, an Open Access fee is generally required.
- 6.3 The payment of the publication subsidy or the Open Access Fee is generally due upon publication of the work. The publication subsidy or the Open Access fee is not subject to reimbursement.
- 6.4 We will be happy to support you in applying for any outside funding by providing any necessary calculations or paperwork, and will fulfil funder requirements.

7 Free Copies

If you provide us with your e-mail address you can download a PDF of your contribution from our website. The number of free print copies is agreed upon in the contract concluded with your editor. You may acquire further non-German copies of your own Work as well as all book titles from the publisher, including eBooks, at a discount of 30% off the retail price. You are also entitled to a discount of 20% off the retail price of individual subscriptions and single issues of journals. You may not sell free copies or copies purchased at a discount.

8 Subsequent Editions, Revised Editions

- 8.1 A number of factors are relevant when considering a subsequent or revised edition, for example, the economic feasibility of the work, as well as the topicality or the accuracy of the scientific findings.
- 8.2 Should you wish to publish a new edition of your Work, please inform us and we will review your suggestion in light of the criteria above.
- 8.3 Should we decide against publishing a new edition of your Work, we will contact you to discuss alternative options.
- 8.4 Should we decide to publish a new edition of your Work, we will communicate to your decision and negotiate with you a publication plan. You agree to revise the Work according to the current state of the academic discussion and submit it to us for publication.
- 8.5 Should you not be willing or able to perform the revisions yourself, you may suggest a third party to us. We agree not to reject this suggestion without good reason. If you do not wish to make a suggestion, we are authorized to assign the revision to a third party.
- 8.6 In the case of revision by one or more third party/parties, we are entitled but not obligated to continue to use your name in the title of the Work.

9 Reminders

Because our warehouse capacities are limited, we regularly check if our printed stock can be reduced. Through digitisation and print-on-demand, we can keep the majority of our titles available and in print without keeping physical stock on hand. We reserve the right to pulp or sell any remaining stock at a reduced price.

10 Legal Succession

- 10.1 The legal situation must be defined in case of succession. Our obligations and duties according to the *Contributor Contract* will transfer for your heirs in full, with the exception of paragraph 11.
- 10.2 In the event of death before the first edition of the Work is completed, we are entitled to withdraw from this agreement with no claims from your heirs. We may take over the partial manuscript and have it completed by a third party, taking your personal rights into account.

11 Termination

- 11.1 We are entitled to terminate the *Contributor Contract* in writing with immediate effect if our cooperation on the Work cannot be completed as planned, e. g. if you are unwilling or unable to complete the Work. If we have made substantial investments at the time of termination, all rights assigned remain with us. We reserve the right to reclaim any payments already made to you.
- 11.2 You are also entitled to terminate the agreement in writing with immediate effect, e. g. if we are liquidated. In this case, all rights revert back to you.
- 11.3 In the case of termination, we retain the right to continue to distribute any copies of the Work that have already been produced. We may continue to make the electronic version of your Work available on our platform in order to fulfil obligations to customers who have purchased those versions.
- 11.4 If your Work is published as part of a series or as a contribution to a volume or database, we are entitled to terminate the *Contributor Contract* with immediate effect if the contract with the editor expires or is terminated, or if the series or database has been terminated. In this case, we will do our utmost to publish your Work as a stand-alone volume or to include it in another series.
- 11.5 You agree to forgo your extraordinary termination option according to German law for the non-publication of a contribution in a periodical, e. g. yearbook (§45 Para. 1 Verlags-gesetz).

12 Data Protection

We are committed to the responsible handling and processing of the personal data we collect from you. Details can be found in our data protection policy for authors and editors on our website (<https://www.degruyter.com/cms/pages/privacy-policy/?lang=en>). A printed copy will be provided to you upon request.

13 General Provisions

- 13.1 Unless otherwise agreed upon, all provisions of this agreement are valid and binding for both your legal successors as well as our legal successors.
- 13.2 Revisions and amendments to the agreement must be made in writing. Oral agreements and declarations have not been made.
- 13.3 Should individual provisions of this agreement become invalid or unenforceable, this shall not affect the validity of the remaining provisions. You and we are bound to replace the invalid provision with a valid one that corresponds to the purpose and meaning of the invalid one. The same shall be applicable to any gaps in this agreement.
- 13.4 The laws of the Federal Republic of Germany apply to this agreement, particularly the German Civil Code, German Copyright Law, and German Publishing Law.
- 13.5 Place of fulfilment and jurisdiction is the location of our headquarters in Berlin, Germany, to the extent legally possible.

Version last revised: 07.06.2021



I Lies and deception: The landscape of falsehood

Thomas L. Carson

Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics

Abstract: Roughly, deception is intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs. I argue that there is a limited range of reasonable views about the definition of lying and defend the following claims on which all of the reasonable definitions agree:

A necessary condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement or assertion that is insincere, namely, a statement that one believes to be false or doesn't believe to be true. (One can't lie unless one makes an insincere statement.)

A sufficient condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement that: a. is false, b. one believes is false, c. one makes with the intention to deceive others, and d. one makes in a context in which one implicitly or explicitly assures others that what one says is true. (Any statement that satisfies conditions a-d is a lie.)

I explain the differences between lying, deception, and withholding information and propose a distinction between misleading and deceiving. Then I explain Frankfurt's concept of bullshit (which involves indifference to the truth of one's statements), the concepts of spin and partial truths, and the distinction between the truth and truthfulness of statements. I conclude by discussing two other important concepts: preventing people from acquiring true beliefs and undermining knowledge and trust in reliable sources of information.

We need to be clear about what we mean whenever we claim that someone performed acts of lying, deception, misleading, withholding information, bullshitting, spinning events, telling half-truths, etc. Any moral assessment of these actions presupposes an account of what it is do them.

With qualifications, I define deception as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs. I will not attempt to defend any particular definition of lying. Rather, I will identify a range of reasonable definitions and defend the following two claims on which all of the reasonable definitions agree:

1. A *necessary condition* for telling a lie is that one makes a statement that is insincere, i.e., a statement that one believes to be false (or doesn't believe to be true).

Thomas L. Carson, Loyola University of Chicago, e-mail: tcarson@luc.edu

<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110733730-002>

2. A *sufficient condition* for telling a lie is that one makes a statement that: a. is false, b. one believes is false, c. one makes with the intention to deceive others, and d. one makes in a context in which one implicitly or explicitly assures others that what one says is true.

I explain the distinctions between lying and deception, lying and withholding information, lying and failing to correct mistakes, lying and false implicatures, deceiving and misleading, and the distinction between the truth and truthfulness of statements. I also discuss the concepts of bullshit, spin, half-truths, and preventing people from acquiring knowledge by undermining trust in reliable sources of information. This paper proposes a map of the relationships among many different concepts. Each of my definitions should be assessed in terms of its place in the entire account.

1 Lying

Consider the following definition of lying:

A lie is a statement that is 1. false, 2. insincere (a statement that the speaker believes is false¹), and 3. is intended to deceive others.

Each of these three conditions is included in some of the definitions of lying that can be found in dictionaries and the work of philosophers and linguists.

Lying requires the use of language. In order to lie, one must make a statement or assertion – it is impossible to lie without making a statement (cf. Fallis 2009: 37–38). A person who nods or shakes her head to answer “yes” or “no” to a question uses language to make a statement. If you deceive another person without using language, for example, if you successfully fake a pass in basketball, you are not lying. Lies must be insincere statements: at a minimum if I believe that what I am saying is true, I can’t be lying.²

Saint Augustine’s definition of lying resembles the foregoing definition, except that it does not include the requirement that lies must be false statements. Augustine defines lying as follows:

¹ Most people state the insincerity condition in this way, but we might broaden this condition to read “a statement that the speaker doesn’t believe is true.” In *Lying and Deception* I am neutral between these two ways of stating the insincerity condition (see Carson 2010: 17–18).

² On this point see Fallis (2009: 38) and Stokke (2018: 44); for objections to this view see fn. 14.

To lie is to make a statement that one believes to be false (or doesn't believe to be true) with the intention of causing others to have false beliefs.³

Most philosophers who write about lying think that true statements can be lies. They favor Augustine's definition over the initial definition stated above, and something resembling Augustine's definition is the closest thing to a standard definition among philosophers.⁴ On the other hand, US federal law assumes that lies must be false statements. It defines perjury as lying under oath and holds that statements can't constitute perjury unless they are false.⁵

3 In the *Enchiridion*, he defines lying as follows: "every liar says the opposite of what he thinks in his heart, with purpose to deceive" (1961: 29). He gives essentially the same definition in "On Lying," (1965: 54–56).

4 On this point, see Mahon 2015.

5 Digressive footnote. In the case of *Bronston v. The United States*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a witness cannot be convicted of perjury if what she says is true (Tiersma 2004: 940; see also Chapter 14). President Bill Clinton appealed to this principle when he defended himself against charges of lying and perjury. During his deposition in the Paula Jones case, he was asked "Did you have an extramarital sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky?" He answered "no." Later he admitted that he had engaged in "inappropriate intimate conduct" with Lewinsky. But he insisted that he hadn't lied earlier (Tiersma 2004: 941). Common usage differs on the question of whether engaging in oral sex constitutes "having sex." In a 1999 study of the ordinary usage of the term "having sex" involving 600 college students, slightly more than 40% of them said that having oral sex constituted having sex (Tiersma 2004: 944). It seems to be debatable whether or not what Clinton said on this occasion was false, therefore, it is debatable whether or not he committed perjury.

Later, when he appeared before the Starr grand jury, Clinton was asked whether he had had "sexual relations" with Lewinsky. The following definition of "sexual relations" was stipulated for purposes of answering the question: "[A] person engages in "sexual relations" when the person knowingly engages in or causes . . . [1] contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person . . . "Contact" means intentional touching, either directly or through clothing (Tiersma 2004: 946–947).

Clinton testified that he did not have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. Later, during his impeachment trial, he admitted that his testimony was deceptive and misleading, but he claimed that his statement was not a lie and not a case of perjury, because it was true. He claimed that, given the definition of having sexual relations stipulated for his testimony, he did not have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. He was not trying to give her sexual pleasure and he did not touch any of the specified parts of her body to sexually arouse her or give her sexual pleasure. However, Clinton to the contrary, his actions with Monica Lewinsky satisfied the conditions of this definition of "sexual relations." He initiated contact between the genitalia of a person (himself) and Monica Lewinsky in order to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of a person (himself) – note the wording of the definition of "sexual relations" – "any person."

On another occasion, Clinton was asked whether he had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He answered "There is no relationship." His answer was true, but deceptive (there had been a sexual relationship, but it had ended before he said this).

William Lycan (2006: 165) reports a study which found that roughly 40% of college students think that a lie must be a false statement, 40% don't think that a lie must be a false statement, and 20% aren't sure. This survey tested students' reactions to a true statement that the speaker believed was false and made with the intention of deceiving others. Students were asked whether or not this statement was a lie. A recent paper by Turri and Turri involves a similar kind of study. The results of this study support the view most English-speakers use the word "lie" in a way that presupposes that lies must be false statements. Participants in the study were asked about the following story:

Jacob, whose friend Mary is being sought by the authorities. Federal agents visit Jacob and ask where Mary is. Mary is at the grocery store but Jacob thinks that Mary is at her brother's house . . . Jacob tells them that Mary is at the grocery store, so that what he says is true despite his intention. (Turri and Turri 2015: 162)

Turri and Turri asked test takers to choose between the following four ways of describing the case (so that answering that "Jacob lied" or "Jacob didn't lie" were not the only options):

Participants were then asked to choose the option that best described Jacob when he spoke to the agents about Mary's location: (1) he tried to tell the truth and succeeded in telling the truth; (2) he tried to tell the truth but failed to tell the truth; (3) he tried to tell a lie but failed to tell a lie; (4) he tried to lie and succeeded in telling a lie.

(Turri and Turri 2015: 164)

88% of the subjects "said that Jacob tried to tell a lie but failed". Presumably, those subjects think that Jacob failed to tell a lie because what he said wasn't false.⁶

1.1 Reasons to think that lying does not require the intention to deceive others

Contrary to what the two forgoing definitions (and most other traditional definitions of lying) contend, I believe that lying does *not* require that the liar intends to deceive others. Consider the following example.

A college Dean is cowed whenever he fears that someone *might* threaten a lawsuit, and has a firm but unofficial policy of never upholding a professor's charge

⁶ Turri and Turri also asked their subjects about this case by giving them just two possibilities to consider: "Jacob lied about Mary's location" and "Jacob told the truth about Mary's location." Subjects were asked to indicate their level of agreement or non-agreement with these statements. When their options were restricted in this way, most of the subjects agreed that Jacob lied (Turri and Turri 2015: 163).

that a student cheated on an exam unless the student confesses to having cheated. The Dean is very cynical about this and believes that students are guilty *whenever* they are charged. A student is caught in the act of cheating on an exam by copying from a “crib sheet.” The professor fails the student for the course and the student appeals the professor’s decision to the Dean who has the ultimate authority to assign the grade. The student is privy to information about the Dean’s *de facto* policy and, when called before the Dean, he (the student) affirms that he didn’t cheat on the exam. He claims that he inadvertently forgot to put his “review sheet” away when the exam began and that he never looked at it during the exam. The student says this on the record in an official proceeding and thereby warrants the truth of statements he knows to be false. He intends to avoid punishment by doing this. Even if he has no intention of deceiving the Dean that he didn’t cheat, he is lying. If he is really hard-boiled, the student will take pleasure in thinking that the Dean knows that he is guilty. An objector might say that surely the student intends to deceive *someone* – his parents or future employers. However, this is not the case. The student in my example doesn’t care whether or not others know that he cheated – he simply wants to have his grade changed. If it helps, suppose that the will of a deceased relative calls for the student to inherit a great deal of money if he graduates from the college in question with a certain grade-point average. Since the student will receive the money whether or not he deceives anyone, and since he knows that what he says won’t cause anyone to have false beliefs, he lies even though he clearly doesn’t intend to deceive anyone (from Carson 2010: 21).⁷ My

7 Setting the record straight. My book *Lying and Deception* presents three counter-examples to the view that lying requires the intention to deceive: case of the cheating student, the case of the frightened witness (who lies under oath for fear of being killed by the accused, but who neither hopes nor intends that his testimony will deceive anyone), and the case of a person who lies in order to keep a very solemn promise that he “made on his mother’s grave” never to publically acknowledge the fraud committed by a close family member (Carson 2010: 21–23). The case of the cheating student, and the frightened witness are often discussed in the literature, but the last case, which I regard as my best and strongest example, is rarely if ever discussed. Here is that case:

Suppose that while working in his office, I happen upon evidence that my uncle perpetrated large scale fraud in his capacity as a financial advisor. I ask him about this, and he admits to having committed fraud. He calls in my brother and sister who also work in the office and know about the fraud. My uncle then tells us the whole story but asks us to solemnly swear on our mother’s grave that we will never tell anyone else or speak to anyone else (anyone other than the four of us) about this. We all swear to never mention or reveal any of this to anyone else.

After my uncle’s death there is a lawsuit against his estate by the victims of his fraud. There is conclusive evidence of his fraud. The evidence includes the testimony of numerous people (including my brother and sister), secret records of the funds he stole, and records

arguments and similar ones by Roy Sorensen⁸ have convinced many people, including Fallis, Saul, and Stokke, that lies needn't be intended to deceive others or require any kind of deceptive intent. But many others, including Lackey, Mahon, Dynel, and Meibauer, are not persuaded.

How should we define lying if lying doesn't require the intent to deceive others? It is not enough to remove the intent to deceive condition from the dictionary definition or Augustine's definition. The definitions that result if we do this are much too broad, and count as lies things that are said sarcastically or in jest, e.g., "Hi, I'm George Washington" as said by your friend who comes to your door in a Halloween costume. We need to replace the intent to deceive condition with something else. I think that the best condition to add is this: one's insincere statement (or one's false and insincere statement) must be stated in a context in which one gives others an assurance of its truth and invites others to rely on it. Lies must be statements made in situations in which the speaker implicitly or explicitly gives others an assurance that what she is saying is true. When we lie, we violate an implicit promise or guarantee that what we say is true.⁹ This makes sense of the common view that lying involves

secret bank accounts my uncle created to hide the money. There is also conclusive evidence that I knew about the fraud – a handwritten letter from me to my uncle, the testimony of my brother and sister, and wire tapped phone conversations between my siblings and me.

Under oath in court, I am asked if I knew anything about his fraud and whether I ever came across evidence that he committed fraud. Since I believe that I am morally bound by my oath to my uncle (but not by my oath to the court) I deny any knowledge of his fraud and claim that, to the best of my knowledge, no fraud ever occurred. My statement is a lie. What I say is false, I know that it is false, and, since I make the statement under oath, I strongly warrant its truth.

My false testimony is not intended to deceive anyone about matters relating to the lawsuit. I know that my testimony will not cause anyone to believe that my uncle is innocent. Nor do I intend or hope to deceive anyone about what I believe or about anything else. My only intention in this case is to remain faithful to my oath to my uncle. My motives for my actions have been revealed by the testimony of my brother and sister, and I expect everyone to believe their testimony about the time when my uncle told us of his fraud and made us swear not to tell others about it. I am quite happy if everyone knows the whole truth (I think that others will respect my true motives, and I have no fear of being charged with perjury for my testimony). Given all of this, I do not expect or intend my testimony to deceive anyone about anything. (Carson 2010: 21–23)

8 Many of those who think that there are cases of lying without the intent to deceive follow Sorensen in calling them "bald faced lies."

9 Others who accept this are Saul (2012: 3, 18); Ross (1930: 21); Fried (1978: 67); and (though this is less clear) Hartman (1975, volume II: 286). But Stokke, Fallis, and Sorensen, who agree with me that the intention to deceive is not necessary for lying, do not endorse this condition.

a breach of trust. To lie is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, while, at the same time, making oneself unworthy of that trust by making a statement (or a false statement) that one believes to be false.

In defense of this condition, I appeal to what linguists call the “transparency thesis,” which says that, normally, claiming that what you are stating is true is redundant – the default is that when you make a statement you are saying that it is true and giving others an assurance that it is true. In ordinary contexts, stating “The sky is blue” is equivalent to stating “It’s true that the sky is blue.” Not all uses of language involve this implicit assurance of the truth of what one says. When telling a joke, or when speaking on April Fools’ Day, or when writing a work of fiction, the normal understanding that one is giving others an assurance of the truth of what one says does not hold (for more on this see Carson 2010: 24–25).

1.2 The preferred definition of lying

My preferred definition of lying is the following:

1. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a false statement, b. her statement is insincere in that she believes that it is false, and c. she makes her statement in a context in which she implicitly or explicitly assures others that what she says is true.

However, I haven’t shown that lies must be false statements¹⁰ and, therefore, can’t claim that 1 is preferable to the following:

2. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a statement that is insincere in that she believes that it is false, and b. she makes her statement in a context in which she implicitly or explicitly assures others that what she says is true.

Since it is at least debatable whether lies must be intended to deceive others, the following may also be defensible definitions of lying:

3. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a false statement, b. her statement is insincere in that she believes that it is false, and c. she intends that her statement will deceive others.
4. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a statement that is insincere in that she believes that it is false, and b. she intends that her statement will deceive others.

¹⁰ The results reported by Turri and Turri provide some support for this view, but their findings have to be weighed against the strong, but not unanimous, consensus among philosophers that falsity is not necessary for lying.

The question of whether lies must be intended to deceive others is distinct from the question of whether lies must involve giving a warranty or assurance of the truth of what one says. There are reasons to think that lying requires giving an assurance or guarantee of the truth of what one says that are independent of the success of my arguments for thinking that the intent to deceive is not necessary for lying (see my discussion of the “transparency thesis” above and in Carson 2010: 24–29). It is possible that lying requires *both* intending to deceive others and warranting the truth of what one says. Therefore, the following two definitions should also be considered defensible:

5. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a false statement, b. her statement is insincere in that she believes that it is false, c. she makes her statement in a context in which she implicitly or explicitly assures others that what she says is true, and d. she intends that her statement will deceive others.

6. A person tells a lie provided that: a. she makes a statement that is insincere in that she believes that it is false, b. she makes her statement in a context in which she implicitly or explicitly assures others that what she says is true, and c. she intends that her statement will deceive others.

It is a matter of controversy whether or not lies must be false statements. It is also debatable whether or not all lies must be intended to deceive others and whether they must involve giving an assurance of the truth of what one says. However, it is clear that any statement that satisfies all four of the following conditions is a lie: a. the statement is false, b. the person who makes the statement believes it is false, c. the person makes the statement with the intent to deceive others, and d. the person makes the statement in a context in which she implicitly or explicitly assures others that what she says is true.¹¹ All plausible definitions of lying agree about that – they agree that satisfying conditions a-d is *sufficient* for telling a lie. This is a significant result for purposes of

¹¹ I take the claim that a-d are sufficient for lying to be consistent with Stokke’s definition of lying. Stokke defines lying as making an insincere assertion, an assertion one believes to be false, Stokke (2018: 5). According to Stokke, making an assertion “should be understood as saying something and thereby proposing that it become part of the background information that is taken for granted for the purpose of the conversation” (Stokke 2018: 6). Even though my conditions a-d say nothing about proposing that anything be background information or “common ground,” I take it that, in any case in which I warrant something as true, then I am proposing that it be taken as true or on the record for the purposes of discussion or inquiry. Stokke would agree. He takes my idea that liars “go on the record” when they warrant the truth of what they say (see my discussion of the cheating student case above) to be equivalent to the view that liars propose that what they say be taken as common ground or background for purposes of conversation. Speaking with reference to my case of the cheating student, he writes:

applied ethics, since a great many cases that are clear examples of lying satisfy all of these conditions. All plausible definitions of lying also agree that a *necessary condition* for telling a lie is that one makes a statement or assertion that is insincere, i.e., a statement that one believes to be false.¹²

According to definitions 1, 2, 5, and 6, the truth of statements is warranted to varying degrees in different situations. Whether or not giving an assurance of the truth of what one says is necessary for lying, giving others a very strong assurance of the truth of what one says tends to make lies worse (because it involves a greater breach of trust). This is important for understanding the case of George Bush and Dick Cheney and the 2003 Iraq War. Bush and Cheney repeatedly said that it was “certain” that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that it was “certain” that Iraq was actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. They asked their country to go to war on the strength of such claims.¹³

1.3 Lying and knowingly failing to correct honest mistakes

In a casual conversation you ask me “have you ever been to Cleveland before?” I answer “no,” thinking that what I am saying is true. Then, 30 minutes later during our conversation, I recall that I went to a baseball game in Cleveland with my grandfather in 1965. The conversation has turned to a very different topic and there seems to be no point in correcting my earlier mistake. I don’t correct my earlier statement and let my answer “stand on the record.” Because my statement was sincere when I made it and because I had no intention of misleading you when I said it, I wasn’t lying or trying to deceive you. But suppose that I recall having gone to the baseball game in Cleveland *immediately* as I answer “no” and do not correct my answer. This is arguably a lie. Consider another kind of case. Suppose that one’s unintentionally mistaken statement is about a very important matter. For example, a leader says “it is *certain* that Iraq is trying to build an atomic bomb” and urges his country to go to war with Iraq

The shared intuition about the case of the cheating student is that the reason the student makes her utterance – despite the fact that both she and the Dean know full well that it is false – is that she wants to “go on the record.” This idea lends itself to be explained in terms of the common ground. Namely, to say that the student wants to go on the record is just to say that the student wants it to be common ground that she did not cheat.

(Stokke 2018: 52)

12 But we might want to revise this and say instead that making a statement that is insincere in that one doesn’t believe it to be true is necessary for lying, see footnote 1.

13 See Carson (2010: 216–218; 2019: 545–547) for discussions of this.

on that basis. Then, later, the leader discovers evidence that his statement is not true. The leader fails to correct his earlier statement and lets it “stand on the record.” This isn’t a case of lying or deception at the time he makes the statement, but when he knowingly lets his past false statements “stand on the record” and doesn’t correct them, this is tantamount to deception. Claims to the effect that Iraq was actively attempting to acquire nuclear weapons made by Bush and Cheney prior to the 2003 Iraq War fall under this category. Bush and Cheney made a number of false statements about Iraq’s alleged aim of acquiring nuclear weapons with the intention of leading the United States into a war. Later, they received clear evidence that some of their earlier statements were untrue. When they failed to correct their earlier mistakes and let them “stand on the record,” this was deception and when they continued to repeat some of these statements they were lying (see Carson 2010: 216–218).

1.4 Lying and false implicatures

Suppose that you are gossiping about Mr. Smith and suggesting that he is a philanderer. You truly say “I saw Mr. Smith in an amorous embrace with a very attractive woman in a hotel room in New York last night” but fail to add that you know that the woman in question was his wife. (You know that the person to whom your statement is addressed believes that Smith’s wife was in France last night and will take your statement to be evidence of Mr. Smith’s marital infidelity.) Clearly, you are trying to deceive the other person. But are you lying? Jörg Meibauer says that this is a lie because it implies something that the speaker does not believe, namely that Mr. Smith had sex with a woman other than his wife last night. In this respect, Meibauer’s definition of lying is much broader than standard definitions; he rejects the view that lies must be insincere statements (see Meibauer 2014: 100–103, 125). In a forthcoming coauthored paper, he defines lying as follows:

A lies to B if and only if there is a proposition *p* such that 1. A asserts that *p* to B, and 2. A believes that *p* is false or there is an implicature *q* such that

1. A implicates that *q* to B, and 2. A believes that *q* is false.

(Wiegmann, Willemsen & Meibauer 2021: 18–19)

Given the firmness with which the great majority of those who write on this topic believe that lies must be insincere statements, we should retain the standard way of stating the insincerity condition for the definition of lying but carefully mark the category of statements which the speaker believes to be true but intends to deceive

others about something by means of false implicatures.¹⁴ Arguably, they are as bad as most lies and worse than obvious lies that are not intended to deceive others (see Sorensen 2007: 62–63).

2 Deception

I now turn to the concept of deception. A rough definition is as follows: deception is intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs.¹⁵ This definition is mistaken. Intentionally causing someone to believe something that is false isn't always a case of deception. Suppose that Bob is not at home and I intentionally cause you to believe that he is at home. I have intentionally caused you to believe a statement that is false. But it is not a case of deception if I myself believe that Bob is at home. We need to revise and refine the dictionary definition. Here is my proposal:

A person deceives another provided that she intentionally causes another person to believe something that is false and that she believes is false.¹⁶

Some people use the word “deception” more broadly, but this definition has the virtue of making deception a morally salient category and making sense of the strong evaluative meaning of the word “deception.” It is inconsistent to both 1. use the word “deception” broadly to include cases of unintentionally causing others to have false beliefs and 2. attach strong negative evaluative meaning to deception.

14 However, the paper by Wiegmann, Willemsen & Meibauer (2021) discusses examples of true sincere statements that make deliberate false implicatures. They present evidence that most English speakers regard such statements as lies. I can't begin to explain or assess their arguments here. Their claim about false implicatures is consistent with my claim that satisfying conditions a-d (see above) is sufficient for telling a lie. However, if we accept their view then we will want to broaden my claim about sufficient conditions for lying as follows:

Either of the following is sufficient for telling a lie: 1. satisfying conditions a-d, or 2. making a statement in which one knowingly implicates something that one knows (or believes) to be false.

15 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) defines the verb “deceive” as to “cause to believe what is false.”

16 Alternatively, we might want to define deception as “intentionally causing another person to believe something that is false that one doesn't believe is true.” In *Lying and Deception* I am neutral between these broader and narrower definitions of deception (Carson 2010: 48–51).

2.1 Deception vs. misleading

We need to distinguish between deceiving someone and misleading someone. I can't deceive you without misleading you, but I can mislead you without deceiving you. To mislead another person is to cause the other person to have false beliefs (whether intentionally or unintentionally). In order to deceive you, I must intentionally cause you to have false beliefs. So, roughly, to deceive someone is to mislead her intentionally. This account fits well with the ordinary evaluative meaning of the words "mislead" and "deceive." The words "deception" and "deceive" are typically terms of reproach or condemnation. The word "mislead" does not imply the same kind of negative evaluation. The negative evaluative connotations of the term "deception" are often inappropriate in cases in which we unintentionally and blamelessly cause others to have false beliefs. It is possible to unintentionally or inadvertently mislead someone, but it is not possible to unintentionally deceive someone. All this notwithstanding, many people use the word "mislead" interchangeably with "deceive." Further, we sometimes speak about being deceived by natural phenomena, e.g., "don't let the sunshine deceive you, it's very cold outside." So, my distinction between deception and misleading should be taken to be a *proposal* for making our language more precise and perspicuous.

We need to distinguish between unintentionally, but negligently, misleading someone and misleading someone without negligence. Here is a case of misleading someone without negligence. A student dozing in the backrow of a lecture hall is misled by a careful and scrupulously honest lecture. The lecturer's mention of the fact that George Washington Carver attended Iowa State University causes the drowsy student to believe that President George Washington was once a student at Iowa State. In contrast, there are many cases in which people carelessly and negligently mislead others that fall short of deception. An example of this is a glib, careless answer to a question, an answer that one believes is true, but which is false and for which one lacks adequate evidence. Suppose that a patient asks her physician whether a drug she has been prescribed interacts badly with caffeine. On the basis of her recollection of her medical training 30 years ago, the physician quickly answers "no" and then ends the appointment abruptly in order to attend a party. Her answer is incorrect and harms her patient. The physician's statement is not a case of deception or attempted deception, since she believes that it is true. But she has negligently and culpably misled her patient.

In order to be negligent, statements must concern matters of importance. It can't be negligent to carelessly mislead you about something that is extremely unimportant. The standards of care one needs to take in making statements depend on context and the importance of what one says. Careless answers to important

questions by overconfident teachers, physicians, lawyers, or politicians are negligent and can be reckless.

2.2 Deception vs. withholding information

There is a clear distinction between deception (or attempted deception) and withholding information. To withhold information is to fail to offer information that would help someone acquire true beliefs and/or correct false beliefs. Not all cases of withholding information constitute deception or attempted deception. A business person who withholds from his clients information about how much he paid for a product that he sells does not thereby deceive (or attempt to deceive) them about his costs. I am not deceiving you if I never reveal to you information about the most embarrassing moments of my personal life. However, withholding information can constitute deception if there is a clear expectation, promise, and/or professional obligation that such information will be provided. For example, a lawyer deceives a client if she fails to inform him that a course of action she advises him to take is illegal and will subject him to severe penalties.¹⁷

2.3 The difference between deception and lying

Deception differs from lying in two important respects. First, a lie must be an insincere statement. There are many cases of deception that don't involve the use of language to make statements, for example, faking a pass in a football game or wearing a fake beard, wig, and sunglasses to disguise one's identity. Further, true and sincere statements can be used to deceive others. Suppose that I am selling a used car that frequently overheats, and I am aware of the problem. You are a prospective buyer and ask me whether the car overheats. If I answer by making the true statement "I drove the car across the Mojave Desert on a very hot day and had no problems," I am not lying because my statement is true and sincere (I believe that it is true). Even though this statement is true and I believe that it is true, this happened four years ago and I have had considerable trouble with the car overheating since then. I am attempting to deceive you about the condition of the car and its problem with overheating, but I am not lying.

¹⁷ See Dynel 2020 for a more on the distinction between withholding, deceiving, and lying.




Figure 1: The relationship between lying, deception, and attempted deception on the assumption that lying does not require the intention to deceive others.

AU: Please provide missing citation for Figures 1–5 in text.

3 True vs. truthful statements

We need to distinguish between the truth or falsity of a statement and truthfulness of the speaker. A truthful statement can be false if the speaker makes an honest mistake about the facts and says what she believes to be true and non-misleading. Similarly, one can make a true statement untruthfully if one believes that one’s statement is false and misleading. Roughly, my statements are truthful just in case I believe that they are true and not misleading. My statements are untruthful provided that I take them to be false or misleading. All lies are untruthful statements, but not all untruthful statements are lies. It is often much easier to be sure about the truth or falsity of what someone says than to be sure about the person’s truthfulness or untruthfulness, since that requires knowledge of the other person’s beliefs and intentions (cf. Bok 1979: 7–13).



Figure 2: The relationship between lying, deception, and attempted deception on the assumption that lying requires the intention to deceive others.




Figure 3: The relationship between misleading, deception, and attempted deception. (Note: All cases of attempted deception are also cases of attempted misleading)




Figure 4: The relationship between misleading, deception, attempted deception, and lying on the assumption that lying does not require the intention to deceive.

4 Deceiving, lying, and Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit/bullshitting

Harry Frankfurt says that bullshitting involves attempting to mislead others about oneself in a way that is short of lying. His definition of bullshit is based on Max Black’s definition of “humbug,” which Frankfurt (2005: 5) takes to be a weaker, more polite, synonym of “bullshit.” Black (1983: 143) defines humbug as follows: “deception (deliberate deception) short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes”.

Frankfurt uses this definition as part of his definition of bullshit; he agrees with Black that humbug (bullshit) is “short of lying” and that bullshit (humbug) involves




Figure 5: The relationship between misleading, deception, attempted deception, and lying on the assumption that lying requires the intention to deceive.

deception, or the intent to deceive others (Frankfurt 2005: 16–19, 54), but he adds that bullshit involves indifference to the truth of what one says. Frankfurt writes:

It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth – this indifference to how things are – that I regard as the essence of bullshit. (Frankfurt 2005: 33–34)

The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth values of his statements are of no central interest to him . . . the motive guiding and controlling it [his speech] is unconcerned with how the things about which he speaks truly are . . . his eyes are not on the facts at all . . . He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. (Frankfurt 2005: 55–56)

Frankfurt says that bullshit is “produced without concern for the truth” (Frankfurt 2005: 47). If we combine this with his earlier claims, Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit comes to the following: attempting to misrepresent oneself short of lying in a way that exhibits indifference to the truth (of what one says).

Elsewhere (Carson 2010: 58–61; Carson 2016: 56–65) I have argued that Frankfurt is mistaken in the following three claims he makes about the concept of bullshit:

1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others.
2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”).
3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.

Criticisms by Cohen prompted Frankfurt to concede that 2 is false (Frankfurt 2002: 341).

1 and 3 are false because there are cases of open transparent bullshitting in which the bullshitter has no hope or *intention* of deceiving anyone and in which she is concerned to say only things that are true. Here, is such a case. A student who is writing a long essay on an examination knows that she will get partial credit for her writing something no matter how far off the topic it is. She writes a bullshit answer that is not intended to deceive the grader about anything, including the fact that her answer is pure bullshit. The exam question is: “Briefly describe the facts of the case of Dodge vs. Ford and answer the following question: ‘Was Henry Ford morally justified in his actions in this case?’ Defend your answer.” The student hasn’t read the case nor was she in class when it was discussed. Since she doesn’t know what Henry Ford did in this case, she can’t possibly formulate a coherent argument for thinking that he was or was not morally justified in what he did. So, the student bullshits and produces the following answer:

In today’s increasingly technologically sophisticated, internet-interconnected, multi-cultural, and multiracial post-modern society, there are many important ethical questions about the role of business in the larger society. These are important questions since business and its actions play such a large role in today’s society and have such a great impact on all sectors of society. We have addressed these questions in our class. Milton Friedman is the author of *Capitalism and Freedom*, who taught at the University of Chicago, was born in 1913, won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976, and was a major influence on Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Friedman holds that the only obligation of business is to make money for the shareholders, provided that it avoids fraud, deception, and unfair competition. Others say that corporations should be run for the benefit of all their “stakeholders” and give back to their communities. Utilitarians hold that corporations should promote the common good in today’s society. Henry Ford and the Ford Motor company had many obligations in this case. In this case, it is clear that the obligation to society was the paramount obligation. The company failed to live up to this obligation, to an extent, but this is not a black or white issue. In any case, Henry Ford didn’t adequately fulfill his duty to the public. This case has many important implications for today’s society and the role of business in today’s fast-paced, technologically sophisticated, post-modern, twenty-first century society.

(From Carson 2016: 59)

In a slightly different version of this case, the student might be concerned with the truth of what she says. She might know that the instructor will bend over backwards to give her partial credit if he thinks that she may have misunderstood the question, but she also knows that if the things she writes are false she will be marked down. In that case, she will be very careful to write only things that are true and accurate and that she learned in the class, even though she knows that what she writes is not an answer to the question (see Carson 2016: 61). Stokke

and Sorensen agree that these examples show that there are cases of bullshitting without the intent to deceive and cases in which bullshitters are concerned to say what's true (Stokke 2018: 152–153; Sorensen 2011). (For more on bullshitting without the intent to deceive, see Kenyon and Saul's chapter on bald-faced bullshit.)

Although I think that I have good criticisms of Frankfurt's definition, I don't have an alternative definition that I am prepared to defend.¹⁸ Lack of concern with the truth of what one says is an extremely important and salient concept, whether or not it is a necessary condition of bullshitting.

Even if we don't accept Frankfurt's definition, it is so well-known that we can refer to examples that count as cases of bullshitting according to his definition as cases of "Frankfurt-bullshitting." Frankfurt's idea that bullshit/bullshitting involves indifference to the truth of what one says is particularly salient. Many people think that this describes many things said by President Donald Trump.¹⁹ Frankfurt-bullshitting about matters of importance to public policy by people with political authority and/or the power to influence public opinion usually involves a kind of negligence or recklessness. When such people speak on such topics without regard for the truth of what they say they risk greatly harming others.

5 Indifference to the evidence

An important closely related concept is indifference to the evidence and counter evidence that bears on the truth of what one believes or says. Many people are indifferent to, or insufficiently concerned with, the evidence when it conflicts with what they want to believe and/or what they want to say. A clear example of this is Donald Trump's refusal to accept easily verifiable evidence about the World Trade Organization (WTO) that doesn't fit with his view that the WTO treats the US unfairly. While speaking to Gary Cohn, the Chairman of the National Economic Council, Trump said "The World Trade Organization is the worst organization ever created! . . . We lose more cases than anything." Cohn corrected him and noted that the US won 85.7 % of the cases it brought to the WTO

18 The best definition that I have seen is Stokke's (a definition he developed in Fallis and Stokke 2017):

A is bullshitting relative to a QUD [question under discussion] *q* if and only if A contributes *p* as an answer to *q* and A is not concerned that *p* be an answer to *q* that she believes to be true or an answer to *q* that she believes to be false. (Stokke 2018: 147)

19 See Zakaria 2016.

and that the US won cases against China for its duties on US poultry, steel, and autos and for its restrictions on the export of raw materials and rare earths. Trump replied “This is bullshit, this is wrong.” Cohn then said “This is not wrong. This is data from the United States trade representative. Call Lighthizer and see if he agrees.” Trump said “I am not calling Lighthizer.” Cohn concluded this exchange by saying “I’ll call Lighthizer. This is factual data. There’s no one who is going to disagree with this data” (Woodward 2018: 276–277).

6 Two related notions: “Spin” and “half-truths” or “partial-truths”

“Spinning a story” or “putting spin on a story” involves placing an interpretation on events or facts which, themselves, need not be in dispute. People spin events when they place a particular interpretation on them. Political candidates often spin news stories in such a way as to make themselves and their policies look good and make their opponents look bad. Ideologues of all stripes often spin their interpretations of events so that those events seem consistent with their ideological commitments. Sometimes the interpretations they spin are correct, but sometimes not. If someone spins the interpretation of an event, then his interpretation is likely to be biased and unreliable, but it is not necessarily incorrect.

Interpretations that involve spin can be misleading if they advance unreasonable interpretations of events and incline other people to accept those interpretations. Misleading spin counts as attempted deception if the “spinner” knows or believes that the interpretation he defends is unreasonable or implausible. If spin involves making deliberate false claims about one’s state of mind (false statements about how one thinks that events should be interpreted), it almost always involves lying and attempted deception.²⁰ But spinning the interpretation of facts or events need not involve any intent to deceive. Some spinners

²⁰ Mearsheimer (2011: 16–17) holds that spinning always involves distorting the facts:

Spinning is when a person telling a story emphasizes certain facts and links them together in ways that play to his advantage, while, at the same time, downplaying or ignoring inconvenient facts. Spinning is all about interpreting the known facts in a way that allows the spinner to tell a favorable story. It is all about emphasizing and deemphasizing particular facts to portray one’s position in a favorable light The basic story being told is distorted, but the facts are not put together so as to tell a false story, which would be a lie.

accept their own interpretations of things and sometimes people spin so as to counteract the spin and distorted narratives of other people. A person can spin the interpretation of something without saying anything that is false, but a person can also spin by means of saying things that are false. Interpretations that involve spin can be misleading if they advance unreasonable interpretations of events and incline other people to accept those interpretations.

One common way of spinning events is by stating half-truths. Half-truths or partial-truths are narratives consisting of true statements that selectively emphasize facts that support a particular interpretation or assessment of an issue and selectively ignore or minimize other relevant facts that support contrary interpretations or assessments. For example, a politician spins the interpretation of recent events to support the claim that his policies were successful if he describes the good consequences of those policies in great and vivid detail and omits any mention of the bad consequences of the policies in question. A man's description of his marriage to a friend (or the description he gives to himself) is a half-truth if it includes a long and accurate account of unkind and hurtful things that his wife has said and done to him but mentions only a few of the equal (or greater) number of unkind and hurtful things he has said and done to her.²¹

Even when there is no lying or deception involved, spinning often calls into question one's intellectual honesty. Often, we spin evidence to protect our cherished beliefs when that evidence ought to cause us to question those beliefs.

21 Neil Manson believes that spin requires being truthful, but doesn't necessarily involve making true statements; he writes "spin is truthful but need not be true," (Manson 2012: 201). I agree with him that spin can be constituted by false, but truthful, statements. However, Manson is mistaken in criticizing me for denying this. He writes:

Carson is right to stress that spin is not the same as lying . . . But it is a mistake to frame spin in terms of truth rather than truthfulness. (Manson 2012: 201)

Manson (2012:201) says that I hold that all spin involves telling half-truths: "He [Carson] identifies spin as the production of half-truths." This is a misinterpretation of my view. In the work he cites, I don't identify spin as the production of half-truths. I only say that "One common way of spinning events involves stating 'half-truths'" (Carson 2010: 57); this is also my present view and I repeat this statement above. For Manson, spinning can't involve making untruthful statements. He is mistaken about this. Consider a long one-sided narrative that counts as a clear case of spin. Imagine that we add a lie or two to the narrative. The result would still be a case of spin. Since all lies are untruthful statements, this would be a case of untruthful spin.

7 Other important concepts: Preventing people from acquiring true beliefs and undermining knowledge and trust in reliable sources of information

Chisholm and Feehan (1977: 143–145) distinguish between what they call positive and negative deception. Roughly, they say that positive deception is causing someone to have false beliefs and negative deception is preventing someone from having true beliefs. Given standard definitions of deception, in terms of causing false beliefs, it doesn't make sense to call preventing someone from gaining knowledge a case of deception. But, in any case, Chisholm and Feehan identify a very important concept: the concept of preventing someone from acquiring true beliefs. There are other important related concepts as well. In addition to acts that prevent people from gaining knowledge of the truth, there are also actions that undermine people's confidence in truths that they know or believe and actions that undermine people's trust in reliable sources of information. The means by which trust and confidence are undermined may or may not involve lying and may or may not involve deceiving others about the truths or sources of information that are the targets of their actions.

American tobacco companies aimed at undermining people's confidence in reliable sources of information in order to raise doubts about the clear and overwhelming evidence of the health risks associated with tobacco use. They spent millions of dollars to impugn a large body of careful scientific research. In 1964 the US Surgeon General issued a report warning smokers about the connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. Smokers are 10 to 20 times more likely to get lung cancer than non-smokers and are also "more likely to suffer from emphysema, bronchitis, and heart disease. The more a person smoked, the worse the effects," (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 22). In 1967, the Brown and Williamson tobacco company said "There is no scientific evidence that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and other disease" (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 23). An internal memo by a tobacco industry executive from 1969 reads "Doubt is our product, since it is the best means of competing with 'body of fact' that exists in the minds of the American public" (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 34). The industry succeeded in creating doubts about the harmfulness of tobacco. As of 1992, 25% of Americans "still doubt that smoking is dangerous at all" (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 33) and as of 2006 almost 25% of Americans believed "there's no solid evidence that smoking kills" (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 241, 335 n4).

Another example is the very well-funded campaign by petroleum industry to create doubts about the very strong evidence that greenhouse gases are causing climate change. In July 1977, James Black, a senior Exxon scientist, told some of Exxon's leaders "There is general scientific agreement that the most likely manner in which mankind is influencing global climate is through carbon dioxide release from the burning of fossil fuels" (McKibben 2019: 72). As McKibben relates:

A year later, he spoke to a larger pool of the company's executives. Independent researchers, he said, estimated that a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere would increase average global temperatures by 2 to 3 degrees Celsius (3.6 to 5.4 Fahrenheit). Rainfall might get heavier in some regions, and other places might turn into a desert.

Exxon and other oil companies acted on this information in their drilling operations: they "built their new oil drilling platforms with higher decks to compensate for the sea-level rise that they now knew was coming" (McKibben 2019: 74). In the late 1980s, Shell Oil Company scientists "predicted that . . . carbon dioxide levels could double as early as 2030" and that this would lead to "run-off, destructive floods, and the inundation of low-lying farmland" (McKibben 2019: 74). Instead of publicly acknowledging these very alarming findings, the oil companies kept them hidden from the public and engaged in very well-funded campaign of misinformation. In 1988 Exxon's public affairs manager wrote an internal memo in which he recommended that the company "emphasize the uncertainty" in the scientific evidence about climate change (McKibben 2019: 75–76). Oil companies helped to create "the Global Climate Coalition", an organization that opposed fossil fuel taxes and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate.

Two months before the Kyoto meeting, Lee Raymond (Exxon's president and CEO, and the man who had had oversight responsibility for the science department that in the 1980s produced the unambiguous findings about climate change) . . . insisted that the Earth was cooling, said that the idea that cutting fossil fuel emissions could have an effect on the climate "defied common sense," and declared that, in any event, it was "highly unlikely that the temperature in the middle of the next century will be affected whether policies are enacted now, or twenty years from now."²² (McKibben 2019: 76)

²² When he retired in 2006, Raymond took a \$400,000,000 retirement package (McKibben 2019: 77).

References

- Augustine. 1965. *Lying and Against Lying*, in *Treatises on Various Subjects, Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 16, Ray J. Deferrari (ed). Washington, DC: Catholic University Press.
- Augustine. 1961. *Enchiridion*, Henry Paolucci (ed.). Chicago: Regnery.
- Black, Max. 1983. *The Prevalence of Humbug and Other Essays*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bok, Sissela. 1979. *Lying*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Carson, Thomas. 2010. *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carson, Thomas. 2016. Frankfurt and Cohen on bullshit, bullshitting, deception, lying, and concern with the truth of what one says. *Pragmatics & Cognition*, 23 (1): 54–68.
- Carson, Thomas. 2019. Lying and history. In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Lying*, 541–552. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chisholm, Roderick and Thomas Feehan. 1977. The intent to deceive. *The Journal of Philosophy* 74 (3): 143–159.
- Cohen, G. A. 2002. Deeper into Bullshit. In Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), *Contours of agency: essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt*, 321–339. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Dynel, Marta. 2011. A web of deceit: A neo-Gricean view on types of verbal deception. *International Review of Pragmatics* 3 (2): 137–165.
- Dynel, Marta. 2020. To say the least: Where deceptively withholding information ends and lying begins. *Topics in Cognitive Science* 12: 555–582.
- Fallis, Don. 2009. What is lying? *Journal of Philosophy* 106 (1): 29–56.
- Fallis, Don and Andreas Stokke. 2017. Bullshitting, lying, and indifference toward truth. *Ergo* 4 (10): 277–309.
- Frankfurt, Harry. 2002. Reply to G. A. Cohen. In Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), *Contours of agency: essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt*, 340–344. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Frankfurt, Harry. 2005 [1986]. *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fried, Charles. 1978. *Right and Wrong*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hartman, Nicolai. 1975 [1932]. *Ethics*. Translated by Stanton Coit. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Lycan, William. 2006. On the Gettier problem problem. In Stephen Heatherington (ed.), *Epistemology Futures*, 148–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mahon, James. 2015. The definitions of lying and deception. *Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Manson, Neil C. 2012. Making sense of spin. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 29 (3): 200–213.
- McKibben, Bill. 2019. *Falter: Has the Human Game Begun to Play Itself Out?* New York: Henry Holt.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2011. *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Meibauer, Jörg. 2014. *Lying at the Semantics Pragmatics Interface*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Oreskes, Naomi and Eric Conway. 2010. *Merchants of Doubt*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- Ross, W. D. 1930. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Saul, Jennifer. 2012. *Lying, Misleading and What Is Said*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sorensen, Roy. 2007. Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 88:251–264.

- Sorensen, Roy. 2011. Review of *Deception* and *The Philosophy of Deception*. *Times Literary Supplement*. 4 March 2011, 22–24.
- Stokke, Andreas. 2018. *Lying and Insincerity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tiersma, Peter. 2004. Did Clinton lie?: defining 'sexual relations.' *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 79 (3): 927–958.
- Turri, Angelo and John Turri. 2015. The truth about lying. *Cognition* 38 (1): 161–188.
- Wiegmann, Alex, Pascale Willemsen, and Jörg Meibauer. 2021. Lying, deceptive implicatures, and commitment. To appear in *Ergo*. Preprint, PsyArXiv. <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/n96eb>. <https://osf.io/n96eb>.
- Woodward, Bob. 2018. *Fear: Trump in the White House*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2016. The unbearable stench of Trump's B.S. *Washington Post*, 8.4.2021. <https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2016/08/04/the-unbearable-stench-of-trumps-b-s>.

